POEA ADVISORY NO. 05
Series of 2009

TO: All Licensed Manning Agencies

SUBJECT: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Off the Coast of Somalia

The Office of the Undersecretary for Special and Ocean Concerns of the Department of Foreign Affairs, forwarded a copy of a document entitled "Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Off the Coast of Somalia" which was prepared by several international shipping industry groups.

The document details best management practices to avoid piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks on ships passing through the Gulf of Aden.

Agencies may secure a copy of the document from the POEA’s Central Records Division, 6th Floor, Blas F. Ople Bldg., Ortigas Avenue, Mandaluyong City.

[JENNIFER JARDIN-MANALILI]
Administrator

June 1, 2009
MADAM:

I am pleased to forward a copy of a document entitled "Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia" prepared recently by several international shipping industry groups.

This document is very useful as it provides the best management practices to assist companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia.

Kind regards.

Very truly yours,

LEONIDES T. CADAY
Senior Foreign Affairs Adviser & Officer-in-Charge

Ms. JENNIFER J. MANALILI
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Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia

(February 2009)

In an effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia, these best management practices are supported by the following international industry representatives:

1. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
2. International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
3. Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
4. Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
5. Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
6. International Association of Dry Cargo Ship Owners (INTERCARGO)
7. International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I)
8. Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
9. International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI)
10. Joint War Committee (JWC)
11. International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
SUGGESTED PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES FOR OWNERS, OPERATORS, MANAGERS AND MASTERS OF SHIPS TRANSITING THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this document is to provide Best Management Practices (BMP) to assist companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia. The organisations consulted on this document represent the vast majority of ship owners and operators transiting the region.

2. These organisations will encourage their members to utilise these BMP and will endeavour to promulgate these to other shipping interests as BMP for combating piracy in the region. This document complements guidance provided in the IMO MSC Circular 623.

TYPICAL ATTACK PROFILES AND LESSONS LEARNT

1. During 2008 significantly increased pirate attacks on merchant ships occurred throughout the GoA and off the coast of Somalia. The majority were clustered around the northern side of the GoA but some attacks have occurred further off the east coast of Somalia.

2. Analysis of successful attacks indicates that the following common vulnerabilities are exploited by the pirates:
   a. Low speed
   b. Low freeboard
   c. Inadequate planning and procedures
   d. Visibly low state of alert and/or evident self protective measures
   e. Where a slow response by the ship is evident

3. Commonly two or more small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats/ “skiffs” are used in attacks often approaching from the port quarter and/or stern.

4. The use of a pirate “mother ship”, which is a larger ship carrying personnel, equipment and smaller assault craft, has enabled the attacks to be successfully undertaken at a greater range from the shore.

5. Vigilance should be highest at first light and last light, as the majority of the attacks have taken place during these periods.
6. To date no successful attacks have occurred on ships at 15 knots or more.

7. The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship's crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage and employed passive counter measures to good effect.

RECOMMENDED BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

1. Introduction

   a. Whilst recognising the absolute discretion of the Master at all times to adopt appropriate measures to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in this region, this checklist of best practices is provided for ship owners and ship operators, Masters and their crews.

   b. Not all may be applicable for each ship, therefore as part of the risk analysis an assessment is recommended to determine which of the BMP will be most suitable for the ship. The following have however generally proved effective:

2. Prior to Transit – General Planning

   a. General

      i. The Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), is the planning and coordination authority for EU Forces in the Gulf of Aden and the area off the Coast of Somalia. UKMTO Dubai is the first point of contact for ships in the region. The day-to-day interface between Masters and the military is provided by UKMTO Dubai, who talk to the ships and liaise directly with MSCHOA and the naval commanders at sea. UKMTO requires regular updates on the position and intended movements of ships; they use this information to help the naval units maintain an accurate picture of shipping. (See Glossary at Annex A for further detail)

      ii. Prior to transiting the high risk area, the owner and Master should carry out their own risk assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks on the ship, based on the latest available information. The outcome of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery and will mean
combining statutory requirements with supplementary measures to combat piracy.

iii. Company crisis management procedures should consider appropriate measures to meet the threat of piracy by adopting IMO and other industry recommended practices as appropriate to the particular circumstances and ship type.

iv. Advanced notice of the passage plan is required by the naval authorities so that they can identify vulnerabilities and plan suitable protection. This is achieved through MSCHOA. The information provided will enable MSCHOA to plan suitable protection and track the ship's passage through the area.

v. Whilst measures should be taken to prevent pirates boarding, the safety of crew and passengers is paramount.

b. Company Planning:

i. It is strongly recommended that managers and/or the operations department register their ships and passage plan prior to transit of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) with MSCHOA (http://www.mschoa.org).

ii. Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP) as required by the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) to counter the piracy threat.

iii. The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to see that a contingency plan for the high risk passage is in place, exercised, briefed and discussed with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

iv. Be aware of the particular high risk sea areas that have been promulgated.

v. Carry out crew training prior to passage.

vi. The use of additional private security guards is at the discretion of the company but the use of armed guards is not recommended.
vii. Consider additional resources to enhance watch keeping numbers.

c. Ship's Master Planning:

i. Once the ship's passage is registered with MSCHOA, Masters are advised to update their position and intended movements with UKMTO during the planning phase, preferably 3 - 4 days before entering either the GoA or passing the coast of Somalia.

ii. Prior to transit of the region it is recommended that the crew should be thoroughly briefed.

iii. The anti-piracy contingency plan has been shown to be most effective when implemented in advance; a drill is conducted prior to arrival in the area, the plan reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties; including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack.

iv. Masters are advised to also prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the communications panel (e.g. telephone numbers of MSCHOA, IMB PRC, CSO etc – see Contact List at Annex B).

v. Define the ship's AIS policy: SOLAS permits the Master the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes that its use increases the ship's vulnerability. However, in order to provide naval forces with tracking information within the GoA it is recommended that AIS transmission is continued but restricted to ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety related information. Off the coast of Somalia the decision is again left to the Master's discretion, but current naval advice is to turn it off completely. This should be verified with MSCHOA.

3. Prior to Transit Voyage Planning

a. Masters having registered their ship with MSCHOA should report to UKMTO before entering the GoA or passing the coast of Somalia.

b. Inside the GoA

i. EUNAVFOR strongly recommends that ships conduct their passage within the IRTC. Westbound ships should bias
themselves to the northern portion of the corridor, and eastbound ships to the southern portion. Group Transit (GT) guidance within the GoA for times and speeds are on the MSCHOA web site, if a GT is contemplated.

ii. Ships should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters (TTWs) while on transit. This is for reasons of customary international law, as it is not possible for international military forces (non Yemeni) to be able to protect ships that are attacked inside Yemeni TTW.

iii. Ships may be asked to make adjustments to passage plans to conform to MSCHOA routing advice.

iv. During GTs ships should not expect to be permanently in the company of a warship. But all warships in the GoA, whether part of EUNAVFOR or coordinating with them, will be aware of the GoA GTs and will have access to the full details of vulnerable shipping.

v. MSCHOA strongly recommends Masters make every effort to plan transit periods of highest risk areas of the GoA for night passage (MSCHOA will advise ships). Very few successful attacks have occurred at night.

c. Outside the GoA

i. Ships transiting South and East of the Coast of Somalia to ports outside of East Africa should consider navigating to the east of Madagascar or (for guidance) maintain a distance of more than 600 nautical miles from the coastline.

ii. Masters should still update UKMTO in the usual manner with their ship course and details.

4. Prior to Transit – Defensive Measures

a. Taking into account the manning levels, ensure that ship routines are adjusted sufficiently in advance to ensure well-rested and well-briefed crew are on watch and ensure sufficient watch keepers are available.

b. Consider minimising external communications (radios, handsets and AIS information) to essential safety and security related communication and SOLAS information only, during transit of the GoA and passing the Coast of Somalia.
c. Increase readiness and redundancy by running additional auxiliary machinery, including generators and steering motors.

d. Increase lookouts / bridge manning.

e. Man the Engine Room.

f. Secure and control access to bridge, engine room, steering gear room, and crew quarters.

g. In case of emergency, warships can be contacted on VHF Ch. 16 (Backup Ch. 08).

h. Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck.

i. If the ship has a comparatively low freeboard consider the possibility of extending the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks from gaining hold.

j. It is recommended a piracy attack muster point or “citadel” is designated and lock down procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes

k. Consider the use of dummies at the rails to simulate additional lookouts. However if ship design creates lookout black spots and the security assessment identifies this risk then it may have to be covered by manpower.

l. It is suggested fire pumps and/or hoses should be pressurised and ready for discharge overboard in highest risk quarters.

m. Consider the use of razor wire/physical barriers around stern/lowest points of access, commensurate with crew safety and escape.

n. Consider the use of passive defence equipment.

o. Consider providing night vision optics for use during the hours of darkness.

p. Operate CCTV (if fitted).
5. In Transit - Operations

a. All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged to use the IRTC and follow MSCHOA GT advice and timings as promulgated on the MSCHOA website.

b. If you intend to follow a GT through the IRTC, Transit at the group transit speed but remain aware of the ship's limitations. (Current advice for example is that if your maximum speed is 16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot GT and keep those 2 knots in reserve.)

c. If you do not intend to follow a GT through the IRTC, Maintain full sea speed through the high risk area. (Current advice is that if the maximum speed of the ship is more than 18 knots, then do not slow down for a GT, maintain speed).

d. Ships should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times; navigation lights should not be turned off at night. Follow the guidance given by Flag State Authority (e.g. for UK ships Marine Guidance Notice 298).

e. Provide deck lighting only as required for safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around the ship's hull may extend the area of visibility for lookouts, but only where consistent with safe navigation. (Current naval advice is to transit with navigation lights only.)

f. Keep photographs of pirate "mother ships" on the bridge. Report immediately if sighted. Report all sightings of suspect mother ships to UKMTO and the IMB PRC. (See Annex C for an example of a Piracy Report for passing such information or any other attack or sighting)

g. The Master should try to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. As soon as the Master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately call the UKMTO.

h. Keep a good lookout for suspicious craft, especially from astern. Note that most attacks to date have occurred from the port quarter.

i. Protect the crew from exposure to undue risk. Only essential work on deck should occur in transit of the high risk area.

j. Use lights, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been detected.
k. A variety of other additional commercially available non-lethal defensive measures are available that could be considered; however these should be assessed by companies on their merits and on the particular characteristics of the ship concerned.

6. **If Attacked by Pirates**

a. Follow the ship’s pre-prepared contingency plan.

b. Activate the Emergency Communication Plan/Call in order of priority:

i. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai.
ii. The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).
iii. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

c. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which will alert your Company Security Officer and flag state.

d. If the Master has exercised his right to turn off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) during transit of the piracy area, this should be turned on once the ship comes under pirate attack.

e. Sound emergency alarm and make a PA announcement ‘Pirate attack’ in accordance with the ship’s emergency plan.

f. Make ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup Ch. 08, which is monitored by naval shippship). Send a distress message via the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) system and Inmarsat-C as applicable. Establish telephone communication with UKMTO.

g. Prevent skiffs closing on the ship by altering course and increasing speed where possible. Pirates have great difficulty boarding a ship that is:

i. Making way at over 15 knots.
ii. Manoeuvring - it is suggested that as early as possible Masters carry out continuous small zigzag manoeuvres whilst maintaining speed. Consider increasing the pirates’ exposure to wind/waves and using bow wave and stern wash to restrict pirate craft coming alongside.

h. Activate fire pump defensive measures.

i. Muster all remaining crew in defined safe muster area/citadel.
j. Maximise ship speed. Evidence to date from failed attacks is that the pirates will give up if unable to board within 30 - 45 minutes. If you can buy time until the military forces can arrive, this often leads the pirates to abort their attack.

7. If Boarded by Pirates

a. Before pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO, MSCHOA and if time permits the Company.

b. Offer no resistance; this could lead to unnecessary violence and harm to crew.

c. If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all way taken off if possible and the ship navigated clear of other ships.

d. Remain calm and co-operate fully with the pirates.

e. Ensure all crew, other than bridge team, stay together in one location.

f. If in a locked down “citadel” ensure internal protection/cover is available in case the pirates attempt to force entry. Keep clear of entry point/doors and portholes/windows – do not resist entry.

8. In the Event of Military Action

a. Crew should be advised NOT to use cameras with flash at any time when any military action is underway.

b. In the event that naval personnel take action onboard the ship, all personnel should keep low to the deck, cover their head with both hands (always ensuring that hands are visible and not holding anything) and make no sudden movements unless directed to by friendly forces.

c. Be prepared to answer questions on identity and status onboard.

d. Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region.

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1 This is why early registration with MSCHOA, use of Group Transit Timings and updating your position with UKMTO are all essential; it gives a better probability that naval support will be nearby if the pirates attack.
UPDATING BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

1. It is anticipated that these BMP will be periodically updated based upon operational experience and lessons learned. The parties to this document will endeavour to meet regularly to update these BMP and to circulate revisions to their respective members and other interested organisations.

2. If in doubt, consult the MSCHOA website where additional relevant information will always be posted (noting that this may not be endorsed by all of the above-listed organisations).
ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.

EUNAVFOR

EUNAVFOR is the main coordinating authority which operates the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa). All information and contact details are to be found within the MSCHOA website.

MSC (HOA) Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)

MSCHOA was set up by the European Union (EU) as part of a European Security and Defence Policy initiative to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. This work commenced with the establishment of EU NAVCO in September 2008. This Coordination Cell working in Brussels established links with a broad cross section of the maritime community and provided coordination with EU forces operating in the region. In November 2008, the Council of the European Union took a major step further by setting up a naval mission – EU NAVFOR ATALANTA – to improve maritime security off the Somali coast by preventing and deterring pirate attacks and by helping to safeguard merchant shipping in the region.

UKMTO – (UK) Maritime Trade Operations

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai acts as a point of contact for industry liaison with the Combined Military Forces (CMF). UKMTO Dubai also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send daily reports, providing their position and ETA at their next port whilst transiting the region bound by Suez, 70°E and 5°S. UKMTO Dubai subsequently tracks ships, and the positional information is passed to CMF and EU headquarters. Emerging and relevant information affecting commercial traffic can then be passed directly to ships, rather than by company offices, improving responsiveness to any incident and saving time.

For further information, or to join the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, please contact MTO Dubai: ukmtodubai@eim.ae
## ANNEX B: USEFUL CONTACT DETAILS

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<th>UKMTO</th>
<th><a href="mailto:UKMTO@ejm.ae">UKMTO@ejm.ae</a></th>
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<td>Telephone</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.mschoa.org">www.mschoa.org</a></td>
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ANNEX C: FOLLOW UP REPORT – PIRACY ATTACK

1. Ship’s name and call sign, IMO number
2. Reference initial PIRACY ALERT
3. Position of incident/Latitude/Longitude/Name of the area
4. Details of incident:
   • method of attack
   • description/number of suspect craft
   • number and brief description of pirates
   • what kind of weapons did the pirates carry
   • any other information (e.g. language spoken)
   • injuries to crew and passengers
   • damage to ship (which part of the ship was attacked?)
   • action taken by the Master and crew
   • was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?
   • action taken by the Coastal State.
5. Last observed movements of pirates / suspect craft
6. Assistance required
7. Preferred communications with reporting ship: Appropriate Coast Radio Station /HF/MF/VHF/Inmarsat IDs (plus ocean region code)/MMSI
8. Date/time of report (UTC)